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Abstract – In any multi-hop routing scheme, cooperation by the
intermediate nodes are essential for the succesful delivery of trafﬁc.
However, the effort exerted by the intermediate nodes are often unob-
servable by the source and/or destination nodes. We show it is possi-
ble to overcome this problem of hidden action by designing contracts,
in the form of payments, to induce cooperation from the intermedi-
ate nodes. Interestingly, the ability to monitor per-hop or per-path out-
comes, even if costless to implement, may not improve the welfare of
the participants or the performance of the network.
1 Introduction
In a multi-hop network, a sender relies on intermediate nodes
on a routing path to forward packets toward the destination.
The intermediate nodes may incur signiﬁcant communication
and computation costs in the forwarding of packets without de-
riving any direct beneﬁt from doing so [9]. Consequently, a ra-
tional (i.e., utility maximizing) intermediate node may choose
to forward packets at a low priority or not forward the packets
at all.
The sender can provide incentives, e.g., in the form of pay-
ments, to encouragethe intermediate nodes to forward its pack-
ets. However, the actions of the intermediate nodes are often
hidden from the sender. In many cases, the sender can only ob-
serve whether or not the packet has reached the destination, and
cannot attribute failure to a speciﬁc node on the path. Even if
some form of monitoring mechanism allows the sender to pin-
point the location of the failure, the sender may still be unable
to attribute the cause of failure to either the deliberate action of
the intermediate node, or to some external factors beyond the
control of the intermediate node, such as network congestion,
channel interference, or data corruption.
This problemof hiddenaction arises in a variety of peer-to-peer
network contexts. In application-layer overlay networks for re-
silient routing [1], anonymousrouting[14], as well as those im-
plementing distributed hash tables (DHTs) [23, 24, 27], inter-
mediate nodes may choose not to forward trafﬁc for others. In
wireless ad hoc networks, nodes may strategically drop pack-
ets to conserve their constrained energy resources. Monitoring
is difﬁcult to accomplish given the large scale and the dynamic
membershipsandtopologiesofthesenetworks.EveninInternet
routing,network routers may drop packets for a variety of legit-
imate reasons without notiﬁcation of the senders, and end users
have only crude forms of monitoring at their disposal. Indeed,
the problem of hidden action arises in many non-networking-
related contexts as well. Also known as moral hazard, the prob-
lem is well studied in the economics literature on information
asymmetry and agency theory.
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Figure 1: Multi-hop path from sender to destination.
By adopting the principal-agent model, with multiple agents
making sequential hidden actions [15, 28], we can study the
problem and possible resolution of hidden action in multi-hop
routing. First, we show that it is possible to design contracts to
induce cooperation when intermediate nodes can choose to for-
ward or drop packets, as well as when the nodes can choose to
forwardpackets in differentprioritylevels. Second,we ﬁnd that
the absence of monitoring may have no impact on the sender’s
expected utility. For a sender who wishes to induce an equi-
librium in which all intermediate nodes cooperate, its expected
total paymentis the same with or withoutmonitoring.However,
monitoring provides a dominant strategy equilibrium, which is
a stronger solution concept than the Nash equilibrium achiev-
able in the absence of monitoring. Yet, the use of per-hop mon-
itoring makes the system more vulnerable to several forms of
collusion among the intermediate nodes. Finally, we consider
network scenarios where multiple disjoint paths exist between
the sender and the receiver. If the sender elects to send multiple
copies of the packets to maximize the likelihood of delivery,
it will incur the same expected costs whether it obtains path-
speciﬁc monitoring information or not.
2 Model
Thescenariosweconsiderinthisworkconsistofasinglesender
(the principal) that wishes to transmit trafﬁc to a destination
along a path that is composed of
￿ intermediate transit nodes
(the agents), as shown in ﬁgure 11. The sender makes indi-
vidual take-it-or-leave-it offers to the intermediate nodes, and
the nodes choose between low and high effort actions sequen-
tially, based on the payment schedule, to maximize their ex-
pected payoff.
Each agent chooses an action,
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1In the remainder of the paper, we use the terms principal and
sender interchangeably, as well as the terms agents and intermediate
nodes.
1effort action to zero 2.
The outcome is denoted by
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stand for the respective outcomes in which the packet reaches
or does not reach the destination 3. The beneﬁt of the sender
from the outcome is denoted by
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We assume that the principal cannot observe the actions of the
agents, thus can only make the payment contingent on the out-
come.
The utility of agent
￿ , denoted by
￿
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￿ , is the difference between
the payment it receives (
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The utility of the principal, denoted by
￿ , is the difference be-
tween the beneﬁt it derives from the outcome (
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￿ ) and the
sum of the payments to the entire agent population:
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Finally, we make the following simplifying assumptions:
! Transit costs are common knowledge and homogeneous.
While the assumption about common knowledge is essen-
tial to our model, the homogeneity assumption is for pre-
sentation clarity only,and the model can easily accountfor
heterogeneous costs.
! Thenumberofnodesalongthe pathandtheirorderis com-
mon knowledge.
! Nodes are risk-neutral.
! The
￿
#
"
￿ per-hop transmission events from the source to
the destination are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.).
A sender who wishes to induce an equilibrium in which all
nodes engage in the high-effortaction needs to satisfy two con-
straints for each agent
￿ :
(
$
￿
% ) Individual rationality (participation constraint): the ex-
pected utility from participation should (weakly) exceed
its reservation utility (which is normalized to
￿ ).
(
$
￿ ) Incentive compatibility: the expected utility from exert-
ing high-effort should (weakly) exceed its expected utility
from exerting low-effort.
2The main results that we obtain in this work are not affected by
this normalization.
3We use the terminology of “packet” to refer to the trafﬁc transmit-
ted, but depending on the application, it can refer to any trafﬁc unit.
3 Results
In this section we analyze various scenarios. Scenario
&
￿ refers
to cases in which agents decide whether to drop or forward
packets. This scenario is studied in sections 3.1 and 3.2, where
&
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￿ and
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refer to cases without and with per-hop monitor-
ing, respectively. In section 3.3 we consider scenarios in which
agents decide whether to engage in priority or best-effort for-
warding (
&
(
’ ). Finally, in section 3.4, we consider scenarios in
which multiple disjoint paths exist from the source to the desti-
nation (
&
￿
) ).
3.1 Drop versus Forward without Monitoring
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In this scenario the agents decide whether to drop (
￿
￿
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forward (
￿
￿
￿ ) packets. The loss rate in each hop is
. . Thus,
the probability that a packet successfully gets from node
￿ to its
successor,
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; denotes a successful transmission from node
￿ to
node
= .
The sender can only observe the ﬁnal outcome, that is, whether
or not the packet has reached the destination. Consequently, the
sender makes the paymentscheduleto each agent contingenton
the ﬁnal outcome,
￿ , as follows:
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Proposition 3.1 Under the best contract that induces high-
effort behavior from all intermediate nodes in the Nash Equi-
librium:
! The expected payment to each node equals its expected
cost.
! The payment schedule is:
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! The principal obtains the same expected utility as under
the ﬁrst-best contract (where actions are observed).
Proof The sender needs to satisfy the
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for each agent
￿ , which can be expressed as follows:
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This constraint says that the expected utility from forwarding is
greater than or equal to its expected utility from dropping, if all
subsequent nodes forward as well.
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This constraint says that the expected utility from participating
is greater than or equal to zero (reservation utility), if all other
nodes forward.
Based on equation 1, The above constraints can be expressed as
follows:
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It is a standard result that both constraints bind at the best con-
tract [20]. Solvingthetwo equations,we obtainthe solutionthat
is presented in equations 2 and 3.
We next prove that the expected payment to a node equals its
expected cost in equilibrium. The expected cost of node
￿ is its
transit cost multiplied by the probability that it faces this cost
(i.e., the probability that the packet reaches node
￿ ), which is:
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Finally, it is easy to see that the principal obtains the same ex-
pected utility as under full information. Were the actions ob-
servable, the sender would pay each node that receives the
packet its transit cost,
! , for forwarding the packet, thus the ex-
pected payment to each node would be
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The sender will enter into a contract only if the expected ben-
eﬁt it derives from a successful outcome exceeds its expected
implementation cost. Thus, there is a threshold value of
￿
￿
, de-
notedby
￿
￿
￿ , belowwhich the senderwill not enterthe contract.
This value increases exponentially in the number of nodes,
￿ ,
and polynomially with the loss rate,
. (see Appendix A). In-
tuitively, the longer the path and the higher the loss rate, the
higher the implementation cost will become.
Based on these results, we can already make several interesting
observations:
! The sequential nature of the transmission reduces the
sender’s implementation cost, because the sender needs to
compensate each node only for its expected transit cost,
which is the product of its transit cost,
! , and the probabil-
ity that the packet reaches that node (
￿
￿
￿ ).
! This Nash equilibrium has nice properties with respect to
vulnerability to collusion. In particular, two or more inter-
mediate nodes cannot obtain better payoffs by colluding
with each other,since nodes receivethe high paymentonly
if the packet reaches the destination.
3.2 Drop versus Forward with Monitoring (
*
,
+
￿
￿ )
In this section, we consider the scenario in which the sender
obtains per-hop monitoring information. That is, as opposed to
&
￿
￿
￿ , where the sender could only observe the ﬁnal outcome,
under
&
￿
￿
, the sender is notiﬁed about every node along the
path that receives the packet. In what follows, we assume that
employing per-hop monitoring information is costless. While
this assumption may not be realistic, it providesus with the best
case scenario for the use of monitoring.
As before, the sender wishes to induce an equilibrium in which
all intermediate nodes forward the packet. This scenario essen-
tially reduces to
￿ identical instances of a single principal - sin-
gle agent problem. It is a well-known result (see e.g., [20]) that
if the principal and the agent are risk-neutral, the expected pay-
ment paid by the principal equals the payment under full infor-
mation.
Proposition 3.2 Thesenderderives thesameexpectedutilityin
equilibrium whether it obtains per-hop monitoring information
or not.
Proof The expected utility of the sender is the difference be-
tween its expected beneﬁt and its expected payment. Because
the expected beneﬁt when all nodes forward is the same under
both scenarios, we only need to show that the expected total
payment is identical as well.
Under the monitoring mechanism, the sender has to satisfy the
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scenarios
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These constraints can be expressed as follows:
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The two constraints bind at the best contract as before, and we
get the following payment schedule:
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Many of the works in the ﬁeld of incentive mechanisms for
multi-hop routing presuppose the requirement of per-hop mon-
itoring and propose various monitoring mechanisms to detect
the location of the failure [29]. These monitoring mechanisms
raise various challenges and may be difﬁcult or costly to im-
plement. The results obtained in this section challenge the as-
sumption that per-hopmonitoringis essential in order to induce
cooperative behavior or even that it improves the welfare of the
participants or the system performance.
However, while monitoring does not affect the expected util-
ity of the participants, several issues arise when comparing the
two scenarios (
&
￿
￿ and
&
￿
￿
). First, in the absence of monitor-
ing, the strategy proﬁle of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is a Nash equilibrium,
which means that no agent has an incentive to deviate unilater-
ally from the strategy proﬁle. In contrast, with the use of mon-
itoring, the action chosen by node
￿ is independent of the other
agents’ forwardingbehavior.Therefore,monitoringprovidesus
withdominantstrategyequilibrium,whichis astrongersolution
concept than Nash equilibrium. The tradeoffs between different
solution concepts in the context of online environmentsare dis-
cussed in [12, 13].
Second, the payment structure is different. While in
&
￿
￿ the
payment to each node depends on its location (
￿ ), monitoring
provides us with
￿ identical contracts. This difference becomes
important if we relax the assumption that the nodes’ location is
common knowledge. In
&
￿
￿ , where nodes in different locations
face different contracts, nodes may strategically misreport their
location in order to maximizetheir expectedpayoff.In contrast,
when monitoring is used, the sender should not be concerned
about this type of strategic behavior since all
￿ contracts are
identical.
One particular mechanism that provides the sender with per-
hop information is the acknowledgment (ack) mechanism, in
which every node sends an ack to the server if it receives the
packet. Following the assumption about costless monitoring,
we assume that ack transmission is costless and experience no
loss. We claimed above that the use of monitoring provides us
with dominant strategy equilibrium. However, in this particular
monitoring mechanism, forwarding a packet weakly dominates
dropping only if node
￿
"
￿ sends an ack if it receives it. There-
fore, while the choice to drop or forward is independent of the
other agents’ forwarding behavior, it still depends on their will-
ingness to adhere to the ack protocol. For this reason, the pay-
ment scheme needs to address the strategic considerationof ack
transmission as well. But if the
$
% constraint is satisﬁed and
ack transmission incurs no cost, nodes have no incentive to de-
cline ack transmission, since a node is paid only if it sends an
ack 4. Thus, the strategy proﬁle in which all nodes forward and
abide by the ack protocol is a Nash equilibrium. However, the
monitoringmechanism is vulnerable to collusion among nodes.
For example, several nodes may collude to report they have re-
ceived the packet, thereby gaining the beneﬁt of the high pay-
ment without incurring the forwarding cost.
4The additional condition is:
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, , which is satisﬁed.
3.3 Priority versus Best-Effort Forwarding (
*
/
. )
The next scenario we consider is one in which nodes choose
between best-effort forwarding (
￿ = 0) and priority forwarding
(
￿ =1).Incontrastto
&
￿ ,apacketmayreachthenexthopevenif
the low-effort action is taken. However, if the high-effortaction
is taken, the loss rate decreases. Consequently, the probability
that a packet is successfully transmitted from node
￿ to node
￿
"
￿ is:
/
1
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￿
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￿
3
2
4
￿
6
5
7
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￿
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1
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￿
￿ (4)
where:
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
.
￿
￿
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
We distinguish between the loss rate that is under the control of
the node (e.g., buffer overﬂow), and the loss rate that is beyond
the control of the node (e.g., data corruption, network conges-
tion). The former is captured by
0 , and their aggregated effect
is captured by
. .
Proposition 3.3 In
&
￿
’ , like in
&
￿ , the sender derives the same
expected utility whether it obtains per-hop monitoring informa-
tion or not.
Proof See Appendix B.
While the main result remains the same, the payment structures
in
&
￿ and
&
(
’ are different. In particular, while in
&
￿
<
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ at
the best contract, in
&
￿
’
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (see equation 5 in Appendix B).
Thus, under limited liability, which requires that
￿
￿
￿
D
￿
￿ (essen-
tially, prohibits transfer of money from an intermediate node to
the sender), the expected payment to each node will exceed its
expected transit cost.
There is an additional difference between
&
￿ and
&
￿
’ . In
&
￿ , a
sender either signs a contract with all
￿ nodes along the path or
with none.This is because one nodethat drops the packet deter-
mines a failure, even if all other nodes potentially forward. In
contrast, in
&
￿
’ , the payments are used to increase the probabil-
ity of delivery success, but a success may occur under the low
effortactions as well. Therefore,in
&
￿
’ the sendermay be better-
offsigninga contractonlywith
2 ofthe
￿ nodesalongthepath.
While the expectedoutcome depends on
2 , it is independentof
which speciﬁc
2 nodes are induced. On the other hand, the in-
dividual expected payment decreases in
￿ . Therefore, a rational
sender who wishes to sign a contract with only
2 out of the
￿
nodes should sign contracts with the nodes that are closer to the
destination; namely, nodes
￿
￿
￿
1
2
"
￿
￿
￿
4
3
￿
3
￿
3
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
3.4 Multi-Path Routing (
*
6
5 )
In this section we consider network scenarios where multiple
disjoint paths exist between the sender and the receiver, and the
sender can elect to send multiple copies of the packets to max-
imize the likelihood of delivery. For simplicity, we analyze the
network scenario shown in ﬁgure 2, but it can be easily general-
ized to any ﬁnite number of parallel disjoint paths. The sender
can contract with both
7 and
8 , only with one of them, or with
none, where the decision depends on the system’s parameter,
. ,
! , and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . In this section, we consider a sender who chooses
to contract with both
7 and
8 .
4S￿ D￿
B￿
A￿
Figure 2: Two parallel disjoint paths from source to destination.
We consider the following two scenarios:
(
&
￿
)
￿
￿ ) No per-path information: the sender observes whether at
least one copy of the packet has reached the destination,
but cannot verify the paths through which it arrived. The
payments are contingent solely on whether at least one
copy arrived.
(
&
￿
)
￿
) Per-path information: the sender obtains path-speciﬁc
monitoring information, and the payments to node
￿ are
contingentonsuccessfuldeliverythroughthepathcontain-
ing
￿ .
Proposition 3.4 If the sender elects to send multiple copies of
the packets to maximize the likelihood of delivery, it will incur
the same expected costs whether it obtains path-speciﬁc moni-
toring information or not.
Proof See Appendix C.
4 Literature Review
Wireless ad hoc routing has attracted a lot of attention in the
context of non-cooperative behavior, including both malicious
and selﬁsh behavior. The detection and report mechanisms pro-
posed in [19] route around malicious nodes. While mitigating
malicious behavior, they are not effective against selﬁsh behav-
ior, which is the focus of this paper.
In order to mitigate selﬁsh behavior, some approaches require
reputation exchange between nodes [4, 5, 6], or simply ﬁrst-
hand observations [3], which are used to reward the well-
behaving nodes and punish the misbehaving ones. Other ap-
proachesproposepaymentschemes[7, 18, 21, 29] to encourage
cooperation.
The problem of information asymmetry has been studied in the
context of BGP routing, using the methodology of distributed
algorithmic mechanism design (DAMD) [10, 11]. The focus in
DAMD is the design of payment schemes that induce nodes to
truthfully reveal their transit costs, thereby enabling nodes to
ﬁnd the optimal paths. However, they do not specify how to
enforce the desired forwarding behavior. This problem is con-
sidered in [26], which attempts to respond to the challenge of
DAMD raised in [12]: “if the same agents that seek to manip-
ulate the system also run the mechanism, what prevents them
from deviating from the mechanism’s proposed rules to maxi-
mize their own welfare?” The authors propose various monitor-
ing mechanisms in which nodes audit their neighbours’ behav-
ior. Monitoringis also proposed in [29], where the intermediate
nodes send receipts to a third-party entity to indicate that they
receivedthe packet. As anotherexample,[21] proposesan audit
mechanism in the context of priority forwarding.
The problemof informationasymmetryandhidden-action(also
known as moral hazard) is well studied in the economics liter-
ature [8, 15, 20, 22, 28]. [15] identiﬁes the problem of moral
hazard in production teams, and shows that it is impossible to
design a sharing rule which is efﬁcient and budget-balanced.
[28]showsthatthistaskismadepossiblewhenproductiontakes
place sequentially, and [2] distinguishes between strategic sub-
stitutes and complements, and shows that a principal is better-
off under sequential production of strategic complements, but
prefers simultaneous production of strategic substitutes.
The focus of this work is the design of a payment scheme that
provides the appropriate incentives within the context of multi-
hop routing. Like other works in this ﬁeld, we assume that
all the accounting services are done using out-of-band mech-
anisms. Security issues within this context, such as node au-
thentication or message encryption, are orthogonal to the prob-
lem presented in this paper, and can be found, for example,
in [16, 17, 25].
5 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this work, we identify the problemof hidden-actionin multi-
hop routing, and show that it is possible to induce cooperative
behavior under hidden-action by appropriate contract design.
We conclude that monitoring per-hop outcomes in single-path
scenarios or obtaining path-speciﬁc monitoring information in
networkscenarios with multiple disjoint paths may not improve
the utility of the participants or the network performance.
These results can help inﬂuence how system design should pro-
ceed with respect to issues such as the desired level of account-
ability or the need for infrastructure that supports lightweight
contracts. In particular, our results show that under some as-
sumptions, it is possible to achieve ﬁrst-best utility by observ-
ing the ﬁnal outcome solely. In these cases, monitoring may be
worthless. However, we may ﬁnd that under a different set of
assumptions, per-hop information may yield some beneﬁt, in
which case monitoring mechanisms should be considered.
Our model and results suggest several natural and intriguing
research avenues:
! Uniqueness of the equilibrium. While the proposed pay-
ment scheme induces a Nash equilibrium in which all
nodes cooperate, it is not the unique equilibrium. We plan
to study under what circumstances and mechanisms co-
operative behavior can emerge as the unique equilibrium,
and highlight the difference between the different scenar-
ios with respect to this issue.
! Sequential contracts. Consider additional models of com-
munication. For example, instead of having the principal
communicate with each individual node, nodes can se-
quentially contract with their successor nodes.
! Risk attitudes.Relax theassumptionabouttherisk neutral-
ity of the agents. While under the standard principal-agent
model, a risk-averse agent prevents ﬁrst-best contracts, it
is shown in [22] that risk averse agents can in fact permit
5ﬁrst-best solutions when dealing with teams of multiple
agents.
! Correlation of events. We assume that all events are i.i.d.
However,the eventsmaybecorrelateddueto differentnet-
work factors. For example, network congestion or weather
conditions may have effect on multiple links concurrently.
! Monitoring. When studying the effect of monitoring un-
der various scenarios, it will become importantto consider
more realistic monitoring mechanisms and understand the
tradeoffs involved.
! Collusion. Monitoring mechanisms in which nodes audit
and report the behavior of their peers are vulnerable to
various types of collusion. We plan to study what forms
of collusion may arise and how they can be mitigated.
! Imperfect information with respect to choice and observ-
ability. In this context we plan to study the results of ad-
ditional solution concepts, such as trembling hand perfec-
tion, which suggest that players act given some perturbed
beliefs that allow for small mistakes.
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Appendices
A Derivation of
￿
￿
￿
￿
The sender will enter into a contract only if the expected ben-
eﬁt it derives from a successful outcome exceeds its expected
implementation cost.
The expected beneﬁt of the sender is:
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Consequently, the sender is willing to enter into the contract
only if:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
1
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
The expected implementation cost of the sender (total pay-
ments) is:
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which, based on equations 2 and 3, yields:
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Therefore, the threshold beneﬁt,
￿
￿
￿ , above which the sender
will engage in the contract is:
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This expressionincreasesexponentiallyin thenumberof nodes,
￿ , and increases polynomially with the loss rate,
. .
B Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof In what follows, we specify the
$
￿ and
$
￿
% constraints
when nodes choose between best effort and priority forward-
ing and no monitoring is used. The constraints are the same as
speciﬁedintheproofofproposition3.1,buttheirvalueschange,
based on equation4, to reﬂect the new version:
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For this set of constraints, we obtain the following solution:
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We observe that in this version, both the high and the low pay-
ments depend on
￿ . If monitoring is used, we obtain the follow-
ing constraints:
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and we get the solution:
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The expectedpaymentof the senderwith or without forwarding
is the same, and equals:
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C Proof of Proposition 3.4
Per-path information (
&
￿
)
￿
). We denote successful and un-
successful transmissions from the source to the destination
throughnode
￿ by
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿ , respectively(e.g.,
￿
￿
￿
means that
a packet reached the destination throughnode
8 ). The payment
schedule to node
￿ speciﬁes the payment
￿
￿
￿ , if a packet reaches
the destination throughnode
￿ , and
￿
￿
￿ otherwise. We show here
the constraints for node
7 (and the same applies for node
8 ):
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Both constraints bind at the optimal contract, and we get the
following solution:
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The expected payment of the sender is:
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￿
Binary information (
&
￿
)
￿ ). Given the restricted information
providedto the sender in this scenario, the payment schedule to
node
￿ speciﬁes the payment
￿
￿
￿ , if at least one packet reaches
the destination, and
￿
￿
￿ otherwise. As before, we show the con-
straints for node
7 , and the same applies to node
8 because
of the symmetry of the scenario. All the probabilities presented
below are conditional on
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
7 , but we omit these
parts for presentation clarity.
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We obtain the following solution:
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The expected payment of the sender is:
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which is the same as in
&
￿
)
￿
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